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Abstract Loss of condence is interpreted as an increase in the ambiguity expe-
rienced by investors who maximize Choquet Expected Utility. Currency crises are
modelled to resemble bankruns. Using countries having fragile nancial systems,
a model of twin crises is obtained.
An exogenous interim loss of condence may trigger a crisis, even when the
`fundamentals' remain unchanged. Not recognizing ambiguity has a similar eect.
Investors `overreact' to bad news, as it leads to an endogenous loss of condence.
The stylized facts of the South-East Asian crisis t the model, and it conforms
well to the basic structure of the EU-accession countries in the run-up to their
adoption of the Euro.
Transparency, competence, and political stability, oer some protection against
currency crises by increasing the level of condence. The best protection, however,
is provided by a stable nancial system, as this enables share prices to absorb the
impact of a loss of condence.
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1. Introduction
What causes currency crises? Clearly, there are some intrinsic problems in the economies
aected, but it is striking that their outbreak often fails to be related to newly emergent
information on fundamentals. Starting with the seminal paper by Krugman (1979, [25]), the
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2literature on currency crises set out to address this problem. In the paper at hand, we argue
that loss of condence, interpreted as an increase in ambiguity, plays a role.
Traditional microeconomics is not well equipped to model this loss of condence. It only allows
for changes in probability assessments based on new information. But this is not what has
been suggested as the cause of some recent currency crises as, e.g., the South-East Asian crisis.
The `loss of condence' is due to a growing feeling of unease with the probability assessment,
rather than to a change in this assessment itself. It relates to a change in investors' perceptions,
not to a change in underlying parameters that might shift the actual (subjective) probabilities.
Including the concept of ambiguity is necessary as conventional approaches do not provide a
satisfactory explanation of this kind of crises.
The fundamental dierence between risk and ambiguity was already recognized by Keynes
(1909/21, [23]) and Knight (1921, [24]). With his famous thought experiment, Ellsberg (1961,
[14]) showed that the subjective expected utility approach of Savage (1954, [32]) does not
capture this distinction adequately.
Two decades ago, Schmeidler (1982/89, [33]) provided a decision-theoretic foundation for mod-
elling ambiguity.3 Within this framework, Eichberger and Kelsey (1998, [11]) focus on a spe-
cial class of beliefs, called E(llsberg)-capacities. These beliefs are a combination of an additive
probability assessment and a level of condence in it. Not only are E-capacities suitable for
analysing the eects of a loss of condence, they also are relatively easy to work with.4
The analogy between currency crises and bankruns has been noticed in Obstfeld (1986, [28])
and more recently in Obstfeld (1996, [29]), bankruns and currency crises both being examples
of coordination games that may have multiple equilibria. We follow this approach and extend
3In contemporary terminology, uncertainty is subdivided in (calculable) risk and (uncalculable) ambiguity.
The latter is some times referred to as Knightian uncertainty.
4Apart from capacities, two alternative ways to model ambiguity should be mentioned. One is the use of
belief functions in the tradition of Dempster (1967, [8]) and Shafer (1976, [35]). The other possibility is the use
of multiple priors, which leads to the maxmin expected utility model, as axiomatized in Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989, [18]). E-capacities are compatible with each of these approaches.
3it by including the stability of the banking sector in the model. By allowing fragile nancial
systems in the countries under consideration, a micro-based model of twin crises is obtained.5 6
As this paper focuses on the causes of a currency crisis, rather than on the timing of its
occurrence, attention is restricted to a three period model. A group of countries with identical
economies compete for foreign portfolio investments by choosing their individual exchange rate
policies, which specify both exchange rate targets and levels of currency reserves. The reserves
are nanced by issuing bonds denominated in local currency, thus sterilizing part of the foreign
portfolio investments. The remaining inow is invested in illiquid assets, claims on which are
traded as shares on the local stock market.
In the rst period, each country announces its exchange rate targets and its fractional currency
reserves. Foreign investors decide where to invest their capital. In the next period, investors
observe a public signal about the prospective asset returns and privately learn their preference
for liquidity. Each investor decides whether to withdraw his capital. These decisions determine
the local share prices.
The local banking sector has a portfolio of collateralised debt denominated in local currency.
The value of the collateral is determined by the local share price. If the share price falls below
a given threshold, the value of the collateral falls short of the level of outstanding debt. This
causes the banking sector to fall below its capital adequacy requirements and possibly to enter
into technical bankruptcy, which poses an acute threat to the stability of the local nancial
system. The monetary authority wants to prevent the breakdown of the nancial system.
When currency reserves cover the total capital outow, the exchange rate target is met. Other-
wise, meeting the target requires a reduced money supply. The reduction in money supply leads
to increased local interest rates and forces investments in the illiquid assets into premature
5Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999, [21]), use the term twin crisis for the combined occurrence of a banking
crisis and a currency crises.
6More recently, Bauer et.al. (2003, [4]) consider a model which incorporates currency crises and default on
foreign debt. Bleaney et.al. (2004, [5]) analyse a model that links currency crises with bankruns.
4liquidation. Monetary authorities choose their initial exchange rate policy under competitive
pressures from the other central banks in the region.
The failure to recognize the presence of ambiguity causes the monetary authorities to follow
an inappropriate reserve policy, as they underestimate the potential threat to the nancial
system when the prospects of the economy deteriorate. Investors seem to `overreact', due to
an endogenous loss of condence. This (falsely) perceived `panic reaction' of the investors may
trigger a currency crisis. An exogenous loss of condence, which may be the result of political
instability, has similar eects.
To prevent currency crises from occurring, local monetary authorities should strengthen their
banking sectors. In a stable nancial system, a fall in share prices can absorb the eects of an
endogenous as well as an unexpected exogenous loss of condence.7 The exchange rate attains
its target value in either case. The stabilisation of the nancial system may involve both
time and resources. During the time it takes to stabilize the nancial system, policies should
be pursued that increase the condence of investors through the promotion of transparency,
competence and political stability.8 9
The model of Morris and Shin (1998, [27]) can be interpreted as implicitly modelling ambiguity
as a lack of common knowledge. In an economy that is ripe for a crisis, a speculative attack
may be triggered when the fundamentals cease to be common knowledge to investors. Thus,
even if the fundamentals have not changed and each investor is aware of this fact, his `no
longer knowing that the others know that he knows that...' is sucient to make a speculative
attack the unique equilibrium. More recently, Bauer (2004, [3]) has shown that the presence
of ambiguity may lead to uniqueness in currency crisis models.
7For a recent example, one may consider developments in the days after the arrest of Mr. Khodorkovsky,
the chairman of Yukos, the Russian oil giant.
8Alternatively, the monetary authorities could announce exchange rate targets that undervalue their cur-
rencies to safeguard against ckle behaviour of foreign investors. For countries like China, which do not face
signicant competition for foreign investment, a permanent undervaluation may provide excellent protection
against currency crises. Competition for foreign portfolio investments makes this strategy, which goes against
the perceived interest of the investors, self defeating in our context.
9The focus on institutions and condence rmly places our model in the category of fourth generation models
of currency crises in the terminology of the survey article of Breuer (2005, [6]).
5In contrast, the driving force behind the result in this paper is a form of dynamic inconsistency.
It occurs as a natural consequence of updating beliefs under ambiguity, which leads to an
increase in the (relative) level of ambiguity and therefore to a decrease in the level of condence.
Investors tend to act more cautiously after receiving bad news, then they initially intended to.10
Eichberger and Kelsey (2004, [12]) argue that dynamic inconsistency in updating ambiguous
beliefs is inevitable.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the model is introduced. The equilibrium
reserve policies are outlined in Section 3. In Section 4 the consequences of not recognizing
ambiguity are analysed. Some stylized facts of the South-East Asian crisis are provided in
Section 5: they accord with the logic of the model, which supports the IMF policy, except
for its demands for scal and monetary austerity. Section 6 indicates that the basic structure
of the model also applies to countries in Central and Eastern Europe in the run-up to their
joining the Euro. Section 7 contains concluding remarks. Some technical material is gathered
in the two Appendices.
2. The Model
2.1. The Economy. Consider a three period world economy containing a region of identi-
cal countries, each of which is represented by its own monetary authority. As the expectation
of stable exchange rates tends to promote trade and thus welfare, the monetary authority of
each country commits itself to exchange rate targets. Apart from the eects on trade, this
policy has consequences for foreign portfolio investment. The latter is at the focus of the
analysis.
Suppose there are many identical investors from the rest of the world, represented by the
interval [0; 1]. Each investor owns one unit of Euros, (part of) which can be invested in the
local asset of one of the countries in Period 0. Alternatively, (part of) it can be invested in
10For the updating of beliefs under ambiguity, we refer to Dempster (1967, [8]), Shafer (1976, [35]), Jaay
(1992, [20]), and Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993, [19]).
6a bond denominated in local currency. For simplicity, we assume the bond has a zero rate of
return. The investment in the local asset pays out in local currency and either has a high or
a low return in Period 2, provided it is not liquidated prematurely. The payouts of the bond
and the asset, which apply for each country in the region, are summarized in the following
table.
payout in local currency Period 0 Period 1 Period 2
Bond  1 1 0
Asset liquidated  1 1 0
Asset successful  1 0 h
Asset failure  1 0 `
where 0  ` < 1 < 1 < h: Ad interim, in Period 1, investments in the asset can be traded
as shares on the local stock market.
Investment in the local asset generates output that may be sold on the world market. Such
investment generates an inow of Euros for their monetary authority, which we assume equals
the payo in local currency at the initial exchange rate, independent of the actual exchange
rate in Period 1 and Period 2.11 Local bonds pay out in local currency in Period 1. As the
proceeds cannot be reinvested in the local economy, they generate an interim outow of foreign
currency. The eective payout to foreign investors, denominated in Euros, depends both on
the value of the claims in local currency and the exchange rate. At exchange rate r; claims y
in local currency yield x = r  y units of Euros. We assume that the initial exchange rate is 1.
Each monetary authority decides on the exchange rate targets r1 for Period 1 and r2 for Period
2. Furthermore, it determines what fraction of its initial capital inow is to be held as currency
reserves. For each unit of Euros held as reserve, it issues a bond that pays out one unit of local
currency in Period 1: The remainder ows into the stock market and is invested in the local
asset. Under such circumstances, the exibility of share prices is a substitute for a exible
exchange rate. The fragility of the local banking sector, however, complicates the matter.
11This may occur when the local asset produces output for an international market where prices are quoted
in Euros.
We assume that unintended eects on local money supply are sterilized by issuing long term local bonds
to domestic investors. These bonds will mature beyond the time horizon we consider and are not explicitly
modelled.
7The banking sector in each country is endowed with a portfolio of collateralised loans denom-
inated in local currency with a total nominal value of v, whereas the value of the collateral is
c. A fall in the interim share price may reduce the value of the collateral below that of the
outstanding debt.12 This leads to the technical bankruptcy of the banking sector and threat-
ens the stability of the local nancial system. The local monetary authority can only allow a
limited fall in share prices without risking the breakdown of the nancial system. Bearing this
in mind, in each period the monetary authority determines the actual exchange. We use c vc ;
the fraction of collateral in excess of debt, to indicated the soundness of the local banking
system.
Through its choice of the actual exchange rate, the monetary authority has the possibility to
make `hold up prots' on foreign investors: after foreign capital is invested in Period 0 at an
exchange rate of one, the monetary authority may be tempted to devalue in Periods 1 and 2:
Thus, it repays investors fewer Euros than it otherwise would have, which increases its prot.
Foreign investors would be less willing to invest in a country that is suspected of applying such
practices. Therefore, monetary authorities may want to establish a reputation for abiding by
the exchange rate targets they announce.
Each monetary authority is assumed to have established its credibility in the past and is
committed to retaining it in the future. This credibility can be secured in two ways, rstly,
by realizing the announced exchange rate, or, secondly, when the target proves impossible to
reach, by implementing the toughest monetary policy available before allowing a devaluation.
Faced with the choice between preventing a currency crisis and securing the survival of its
nancial system, the monetary authority will choose the latter.
A restrictive ad interim monetary policy forces some assets into premature liquidation. There-
fore, we may identify the restrictiveness of the monetary policy with the fraction of assets
liquidated: the toughest monetary policy leads to the liquidation of all assets. Per unit of
12For instance, because banks have lent to stock market speculators. Alternatively, they may have provided
credit to rms that have pledged some of their shares as collateral.
8initial investment it, leaves foreign investors with claims of 1 units of local currency and the
monetary authority with 1 units of Euros.
Ad interim, in Period 1; the economy receives a public signal  2 fb; gg about the economy's
prospects, which applies for the region as a whole. When the bad signal b is received, the
probability of a high asset return in Period 2 is low. When the signal is good, g; this probability
equals one. The joint probability distribution of signals and asset payouts is summarized in
the following table:
asset state (; %) signal return probability
(b; h) b h bh
(b; `) b ` b`
(g; h) g h gh
(g; `) g ` 0
where % 2 fh; `g and bh; b`; gh > 0:
For analytical convenience, we assume all investments in the local asset have the same return.
Either all investments are successful, or they all fail.13 The probability of success equals
h := bh+ gh; whereas the probability of failure is ` := b`:With a conditional probability
of bh :=
bh
b
the assets are successful after the bad signal is received. Similarly, we have gh = 1:
In Period 1; each investor learns his preference for liquidity. This liquidity preference is private
information and is described by his type t 2 fH;Lg: Type H investors obtain a relatively high
utility from Euros in Period 1: The corresponding utility of L-type investors is relatively
low.14 The fractions of H-types and L-types are denoted by H and L respectively, with
0 < H < 1: They equal the ex-ante probability that an investor will have a high or a low
liquidity preference. These probabilities are independent of the asset state (; %). For the
probability distribution  over fH;Lg  fb; gg  fh; `g we have Prf(t; ; %)g = t  %: We
denote S := fH;Lg  fb; gg  fh; `g:
13Thus, we eectively focus on `systemic' or `undiversiable' risk.
14One may be tempted to consider H-types as `speculators' and L-types as `long-term investors'. It is true
that the dierent types behave this way in Period 1: The catch, however, is that the investors themselves do
not know their type in Period 0.
92.2. Beliefs. The investors (potentially) face ambiguity with respect to the joint distri-
bution of signals and investment returns. This ambiguity is modelled by E-capacities as
axiomatised in Eichberger and Kelsey (1998, [11]), who also provide an extensive motivation
for using E-capacities.
The E-capacity (; fEH ; ELg; ); which describes the ex-ante beliefs of the investors, is char-
acterized by three components:
 the probability assessment ;
 the (nest) partition E of the state-space S in unambiguous events, fEH ; ELg; with
EH := f(H; b; h); (H; b; `); (H; g; h); (H; g; `)g
EL := f(L; b; h); (L; b; `); (L; g; h); (L; g; `)g
and
 a level of condence in the probability assessment,  2 [0; 1].
The probabilities of the unambiguous events EH and EL are unambiguously known. So each
investor has full condence in the probabilities that concern his type. Eectively, there is
restricted condence only in (combinations of) strict sub events of EH and EL:
The risk attitude of an investor of type t 2 fH;Lg is described by his von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility index u : R2+  fH;Lg ! R: We assume
u(x1; x2; t) := t  x1 + x2;
with H > L > 1: Thus, the investors are risk-neutral. The utility a type t investor de-
rives from the state contingent consumption (x1(s); x2(s))s2S is dened below as his Choquet
expected utility with respect to u and the relevant beliefs.
For consumption (x1(s); x2(s))s2S and beliefs (;E; ) with E := fEH ; ELg; we denote the
minimal expected utility on an unambiguous event Et  S by
Mt(x) := min
s2Et
u(x(s)):
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The Choquet expected utility of (x1(s); x2(s))s2S for the E-capacity (;E; ) equals
CEsfu(x(s))g :=   Esfu(x(s))g+ (1  )  EtfMt(x)g;
where Esfu(x(s))g :=
P
s2S s  u(x(s)) and EtfMt(x)g :=
P
t2fH;Lg t Mt(x):
As stated above, in Period 1 each investor learns his liquidity preference as represented by his
type and observes a signal about prospective asset returns. As in the additive case, he adjusts
his beliefs about returns to incorporate this information. For updating additive beliefs Bayes'
rule is used. When beliefs are represented by capacities, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993, [19])
show that Bayes' rule can be generalized in a number of ways. Of those rules, we focus on the
Dempster-Shafer rule, which is most widely used.15
The Dempster-Shafer update of an E-capacity is once again an E-capacity, the updated prob-
ability assessment of which is the Bayesian update of the original one. A formula for updating
E-capacities by the Dempster-Shafer rule is provided in Eichberger and Kelsey (1998, [11]).
Suppose the beliefs of the investors are represented by (;E; ) as above and the signal  is
received. The Dempster-Shafer rule now yields the updated beliefs (; E; ) with:
 = b  = g
h
bh
b
1
   b1 g    
g
1 b  
Et f(t; b; h); (t; b; `)g f(t; g; h); (t; g; `)g
where the inequalities are strict for 0 <  < 1:
Given  = g and in spite of gh = 1; investors are not certain that the asset pays out h in
Period 2. This is due to the remaining ambiguity within the unambiguous component Et . No
sub event of Et is unambiguously ruled out from occurring.
When an investor learns  = b; the assessed probability of an unfavourable result increases
from ` := b` to 
b
` :=
b`
b
: The bad signal also decreases his condence in his updated
assessment b, as does a good signal with respect to the condence in g:
15As is shown in Spanjers (1999, [36], Sect. 8:6) for the above beliefs (;E; ); the Dempster-Shafer rule and
its closest competitor, Full Bayesian Updating, result in the same updated E-capacity.
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In the remainder of the paper we make the following assumptions:
 ` = 0 : When assets fail, their payout is zero.
 H > h > L : When the assets are successful, their payout is suciently high to
be of interest to the L-types, but suciently low not to be desirable for H-types when
compared with holding Euros in Period 0.
3. Reserve Policies
In this section we determine the equilibrium reserve policies of the monetary authorities as
carried out by their central banks. At the outset, there are no foreign investments in the local
economy. Its central bank neither has nor needs any currency reserves. The role of currency
reserves follows solely from the interplay of foreign investment in Period 0 and the exchange
rate targets. A reserve policy is represented by the associated exchange rate targets r1 and
r2 for the Periods 1 and 2; and a fractional currency reserve ratio .
3.1. The Representative Central Bank. Monetary authorities choose reserve policies
that maximize their prots from the inow of foreign investment, while avoiding to lose their
reputation for not making `hold up prots'.16 Ex-ante the countries' economies are identical,
as are the foreign investors. The reserve policies that result from competition between these
identical monetary authorities can be obtained as the result of a single decision problem.17 In
this decision problem a representative central bank maximizes the ex-ante Choquet expected
utility of a representative investor under suitable constraints. These constraints are:
 feasibility constraints, which are identical to those of the local central banks due to the
16Alternatively, one could assume that monetary authorities try to maximize the inow of foreign investment,
while avoiding losses on their foreign exchange reserves. In the context of our analysis both assumptions lead
to the same equilibrium behaviour, as in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976, [31]).
17This is adapts the idea of competition between insurance companies modelled in Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976, [31]) to our setting, in which investors are identical in Period 0. The approach has been used in the
context of a competitive banking sector in Alan and Gale (1998, [1]) and has been elaborated on in Alan and
Gale (2004, [2]). See also Spanjers (1999, [36]).
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linearity of the investment technologies,
 a stability constraint that ensures the local nancial system does not break down and
 a condition of `withdrawal equilibrium' regarding the outow of foreign currency.18
In the model under consideration, the stock market essentially transfers local bonds from type
L investors to H-types in Period 1 in exchange for shares in the illiquid asset.19
Let   0 denote the maximal fraction of local bonds that can be held by L-types at the end
of Period 1 without threatening nancial stability. As share prices at which L-types have an
incentive to buy bonds will not occur, this maximal amount can not exceed L :We assume
 is related to the soundness of the local banking sector as
 = L  c  v
c
:
For high values of  2 [0; L] the nancial system is stable, for low values it is fragile. At
the exchange rate target r1; the local currency paid out by    bonds buys r1     Euros.
The equilibrium share price in Period 1 may fail to be unique. This is due to the linearity
of the preferences of investors for immediate consumption and for shares.20 It is assumed
that the central bank acts in the ex-ante interest of the investors and implements the highest
equilibrium price.21
18The possibility that in Period 1 an inow of Euros could take place to partially oset the outow is disre-
garded. It would distort the results of competition between central banks in a similar manner as competition
between mutual funds does in Eichberger and Spanjers (1997/2003, [13]). The distortion arises when investors
can be sure to be able to carry out arbitrage between the countries in Period 1: In the contex of emerging
economies this fails to be assured, due to the possibilities of default on bonds and treasury bills, temporary cap-
ital controls, and suspention of trade in shares and/or the local currency. Such restrictions are not uncommon.
Indeed, they caused the breakdown of LTCM in the Russian crisis in 1998.
19Suppose that at the beginning of Period 1 each investor holds the same amounts of shares and bonds.
Consider the share price for which H-types sell all their shares in exchange for all bond held by L-types. When
the share price declines by a small amount, H-types may still sell their shares, but L-types pay less for them.
They therefore end up holding some bonds in addition to the shares. Similarly, when the initial share price
increases by a small amount, H-types will still buy all bonds, but will hold some shares as well.
20The possible non-uniqueness follows directly by consultation of the appropriate Edgeworth-Box.
21Thus, for given reserves , the representative central bank minimizes the actual redistribution of bonds
from H-types to L-types in the withdrawal equilibrium in Period 1. This keeps the ex-ante utility loss from
transferring reserves away from investors with the high marginal utility of immediate consumption as small as
possible.
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Investors correctly anticipate the eective payouts in Euros, x1 and x2, as functions of the
signal , the exchange rate targets r1 and r2; the fractional withdrawal $ in Period 1 and
the success or failure of the assets. Each individual investor is negligible, so he takes the
withdrawal behaviour of the others as given.
Since H > L > 1; it is optimal to have the currency reserves depleted in Period 1: Taking
this into account, the optimization problem of the representative central bank, given the beliefs
(;E; ) of the investors, is:
max
r1;r2;;$;
CEfu(x)g
such that for each  2 fb; gg:
$ := $(;; r1; r2) 2 $(;; r1; r2) (E)
$  x1($; ) = + 1    (1  ) (F1)
(1 $)  xh2($; ) = h  (1  )  (1  ) (F2h)
(1 $)  x`2($; ) = 0 (F2`)
($   H)  x1($; )  r1    + 1    (1  ) for  < 1 (S),
where $(;; r1; r2) is the set of withdrawal equilibria for signal , given the reserve policy
 and the exchange rate targets r1 and r2; and  denotes the fraction of assets liquidated.
22
Condition (E) states that the withdrawals in Period 1 are compatible with a withdrawal
equilibrium. (F1) is the feasibility constraint for Period 1. The feasibility constraints for
Period 2 when assets are successful and when assets fail, are denoted by (F2h) and (F2`)
respectively. Finally, (S) is the condition of nancial stability in the absence of a currency
crisis.
In general, the currency reserves of the central bank depend on which of the withdrawal
equilibria in Period 1 is anticipated to occur. In the above formulation of the optimization
problem, it is assumed that after a signal is received, the `best' withdrawal equilibrium is
obtained. This implies that we rule out currency crises that are the consequence of coordination
problems only. Thus, we focus on fundamental currency crises. Following the terminology
of Freixas and Rochet (1997, [17]) for bankruns, a crisis is `fundamental' when it is caused by
beliefs concerning the asset returns, as opposed to beliefs about the withdrawal behaviour of
22Withdrawal equilibrium in this setting is dened similar to that in the context of bankruns. See also Spanjers
(1999, Chapter 5). The withdrawal equilibrium is analysed below.
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the other investors.
3.2. Equilibrium. In analysing equilibrium, we start by looking at the eect that com-
petition between local central banks has on the exchange rate targets they set. After nding
that the result greatly simplies our further analysis, we turn to the withdrawal equilibrium
and the equilibrium fractional reserve holdings.
Earlier, we assumed that in each period the inow of Euros generated by the local asset equals
its payouts in local currency. A local central bank with an exchange rate target r1 less than
one does not return the entire inow of Euros in Period 1 to foreign investors. Rather, it
keeps some of the Euros obtained in Period 1 as reserves to carry over to Period 2. This
`undervaluation' of the exchange rate target can be helpful, as it generates a surplus of Euros
that protects the local currency from unexpectedly high capital outows in Period 1:
The surplus, however, reduces the ex-ante utility of the foreign investors. It could either be
paid out in Period 1 to a utility of at least L; or be invested in local assets, with a Choquet
expected payout which exceeds that of Euros carried over to Period 2:
Foreign investors in a country that oers an exchange rate target r1 < 1 will nd another
country that oers a preferred exchange rate policy with an exchange rate target br1 between
r1 and 1: The investors will reconsider and invest in the latter country, making it better o as
well, as it increases its prots from foreign investment. As a result no country that oers an
exchange rate target r1 < 1 will attract foreign investors.
23
This is summarized in the following Property.
Property 1. We may assume without loss of generality that in equilibrium r1 = r2 = 1:
23It should be noted that an exchange rate target r1 > 1 is not feasible. For r1 = 1; the target r2 > 1 is not
feasible either. For r1 = 1 and r2 < 1, some of the Euros remain at the local central bank and are not returned
to investors. In this case another country can improve its position by oering r2 = 1:
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The nature of competition between central banks leads to reserve policies  that maximize
the ex-ante utility of the representative investor. The ex-ante utility of H-types from wealth
invested in successful assets equals that of L-types. But their utility from consuming the same
initial wealth as Euros in Period 1 is even higher. So maximizing ex-ante utility amounts to
transferring wealth from L-types to H-types.
Due to the linear structure of preferences, this problem results in corner solutions. In partic-
ular, the limits of the transfers are determined by the incentive compatibility constraints of
L-types. We proceed by looking at these incentive constraints in more detail. In doing so, we
denote
e := CEf%jg =   h  h:
Consider the situation after signal  occurs, given fractional withdrawals $ = H : The incen-
tive constraint that indicates that at the end of Period 1 all reserves are held by H-types, is
denoted by (ICL). For a given reserve policy  the constraint reads
e  1  
L
 L 

H
:
It holds with equality for
() :=
H  e
L  L + H  e :
If this constraint is violated, this does not necessarily mean that a currency crises is inevitable
after obtaining signal . But due to the fragility of the nancial system, the central bank
can only allow for a limited fall in share prices. Therefore, the relevant incentive compatibil-
ity constraint (ICL ) considers the eective payouts after their maximal decline. When this
constraint is violated a currency crisis occurs.
Consider the reserve policy  and the stability parameter . The incentive constraint of L-types
after signal  and redistribution    through share prices reads
L 
  
L
+ e  1  
L
 L 
(1  )  
H
:
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It is referred to as (ICL ) and holds with equality for
() =
H  e
(L   )  L + H  e :
Clearly, if both e > 0 and  > 0; it follows for each level of condence  > 0 and each signal
 that
() < ():
For the equilibrium exchange rate policy the representative central bank either chooses one of
the above mentioned currency reserves or () = 1, which implements a currency board.24
Theorem 2. 25 In equilibrium we have currency reserves () 2 fb(); b(); g(); g(); 1g:
It should be noted that for given exchange rate targets lower currency reserves make a currency
crises less likely. The reason for this is that it is not fractional reserve holdings that oer
protection against currency crises, but the inow in Euros that is not returned to the foreign
investors in Period 1: As is shown in Property 1, due to competition between the local central
banks, the entire inow of Euros is instantly returned to the foreign investors.
24To interpret equilibria that do not involve a currency board, suppose the investors receive signal  after
their wealth is invested in a country with fractional reserves : Three situations may occur for $ = H :
Firstly, the incentive constraint (ICL) and the incentive constraint for H-types (IC

H), which reads
H 

H
 e  1  
L
;
may both hold. The H-types withdraw their capital in Period 1 and the L-types leave theirs in the country.
The H-types end up holding all reserves.
Secondly, the incentive constraint (ICL) may be violated. To establish incentive compatibility the eective
payout x1 must be reduced relative to x2. In the case (IC

L ) is also violated, such change in payouts is not
feasible under xed exchange rates. Any scope for redistribution from H-types to L-types has already been
taken into account in the latter incentive constraint. Therefore, L-types withdraw in Period 1 and the central
bank implements a monetary policy that leads to the liquidation of all assets. A currency crisis is the only
withdrawal equilibrium.
If (ICL) is violated but (IC

L ) holds, a currency crisis is prevented. The redistribution from H-types to
L-types through a decline in share prices ineciently leaves L-types with some liquidity at the end of Period 1;
but it prevents a currency crisis.
Finally, the incentive constraint (ICH) may be violated. In this case, the equilibrium share price increases
up to the point that the constraint binds. This leaves some H-types holding shares in Period 1:
25The proof of Theorem 2 involves a signicant amount of rather tedious, though not overly complicated,
calculations. It closely follows the proof in Spanjers (1999, [36], Proposition 5.12) in the context of bankruns.
An outline of the proof is provided in Appendix II.
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4. Failing to Recognize Ambiguity
What happens when the monetary authorities fail to recognize the presence of ambiguity?
This question is answered for two guises in which this failure may occur. Firstly, they may
(falsely) believe that investors are fully condent about their probability assessments. The
consequences of such a belief resemble those of an exogenous loss of condence. Secondly,
monetary authorities may interpret the weights the investors ex-ante assign to the dierent
states of nature as a subjective probability estimate. It should be noted that these weights
change when alternatives are considered that obtain their lowest payouts in dierent states.
To focus on the consequences of the failure to recognize ambiguity, the behaviour of the
investors, which is based on their actual beliefs, must be constrained from `correcting' the
mistaken beliefs of the monetary authorities in the perfect foresight equilibrium.26 Therefore,
we make the ad hoc assumption that the information policy of the central bank convinces each
individual investor that all other investors share the monetary authority's beliefs about asset
states.27 Since each individual investor is negligible, only the beliefs of other investors matter.
Suppose the monetary authority considers the uncertain probability assessment to be certain,
i.e., it falsely believes  = 1: It therefore chooses reserves (1). The actual interim incentive
constraint of L-types, however, is the one implied by : Therefore, L-types demand a higher
ambiguity premium than the monetary authority implicitly oers in its exchange rate policy.
If the currency reserves equal b(1); the signal b causes a currency crisis. For reserves b(1)
a currency crises may or may not occur after a bad signal, depending on the fragility of the
nancial system. After the signal g a currency crises may or may not arise. For reserves g(1)
a currency crisis is imminent after either signal if the nancial system is suciently fragile.
26As is indicated in McAfee (2004, [26]), many large rms fail to recognize the importance of condence,
which he refers to as `trust'. In this light, the possibility that monetary authorities may fail to recognize the
full impact of the absence of full condence seems more than plausible.
27A policy environment which, as in the case of the monetary authorities in this section, considers the expected
utility paradigm as the only sensible way to represent uncertainty would encourage this state of mind to be
present. Investors whose beliefs cannot be represented by an additive subjective probability distribution would
consider themselves to be unsophisticated exceptions, even when they are not.
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A second way in which the monetary authority may fail to recognize ambiguity is by interpret-
ing the specic ex-ante weights the investors assign to the dierent states of nature as their
subjective probability distribution b := (bH ; bL). This distribution is derived in Appendix I.
The E-capacity (;E; ); representing the actual beliefs, is updated using the Dempster-Shafer
rule,28 whereas b is updated by Bayes' rule. We obtain the following weights for the asset
states when considering the equilibrium withdrawal behaviour of L-types:
(b; h) (b; `) (g; h) (g; `)
Dempster-Shafer weight
  bh
1    g
1    bh
1    g
  g
1    b
1  
1    b
Bayes' weight
bh
b
b`
b
  g
1    b
1  
1    b
As the dierence in weights shows, the dynamics of the actual beliefs after a bad signal fail to
be reproduced by additive probabilities and Bayesian updating.
The fractional currency reserve ratio for which (ICgL) binds for the subjective probability
distribution b is denoted by g(b; 1):When the representative central bank chooses this reserve
policy, the failure to recognize the presence of ambiguity does not inuence the withdrawal
equilibrium, since g(b; 1) = g() and g(b; 1) = g(). Any fundamental crisis that the
central bank may anticipate after the bad signal also occurs when the Dempster-Shafer rule is
applied, although after a bad signal a currency crisis may occur where none is expected. After
a good signal, the updated probabilities equal the weights assigned by the updated E-capacity.
The incentive compatibility constraint of type-L investors holds.
For currency reserves b(b; 1) the misjudgment of the monetary authorities has serious con-
sequences, as it may have for reserves b(b; 1). When a bad signal is received and currency
reserves are b(b; 1), the incentive constraint for L-types just holds for the updated proba-
bility bbL after the maximal fall in share prices. But the investors assign weights according to
Dempster-Shafer updated E-capacity. They put a weight on (b; `) which exceeds the proba-
bility assigned by the monetary authority. Therefore, the incentive constraint of L-types is
violated and a currency crisis occurs.
28See Section 2.2.
19
The central bank may interpret this crisis for reserve holdings b(b; 1) as caused by an `ir-
rational overreaction' of the L-type investors who `lose their nerves'. After a bad signal is
received, the falsely perceived `panic reaction' of the investors in fact is a fundamental cur-
rency crisis.
5. The South-East Asian Crisis
Having analysed our model of currency crises in the presence of ambiguity, we now confront
it with the stylised facts of the South-East Asian Crisis.29 This crisis aected a number of
more or less similar economies in the same geographical region. It provides an example where
monetary authorities of similar countries used exchange rate policies to compete for foreign
investments.
In the light of our model, two distinct phases of the South-East Asian crisis can be recognized.
The rst phase was characterized by an exogenous loss of condence. It has its roots in the
clumsy and at times incompetent reactions to the crisis of the Thai Baht. The second phase
was characterized by an endogenous loss of condence. The latter was caused by bad news
concerning the fundamentals of the economies in the region.
The initial `speculative attack' on the Baht may well have been caused by a worsening of
the prospects for Thai assets. In terms of the model, the incentive constraint of some pa-
tient investors was violated. Either a more rapid decline in stock prices or giving in to the
international pressure to devalue might have solved the problem at an early stage.
The Thai government, however, failed to link the attack to fundamental problems. Its stubborn
reaction led to a loss of condence in its economic competence, inducing a further outow of
capital. After depleting its currency reserves in trying to defend its exchange rate peg, it was
forced to let the Baht oat. As the mutual stand-by treaties with its neighbours failed to stop
the fall, condence in its neighbours also declined, as did their stock markets and currencies.
29For an excellent paper on the South-East Asian Crisis in a broader perspective (disguised as a book review)
see Williamson (2004, [38]).
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The reaction of the region's governments to the devaluations merely increased doubts about
their economic competence. The economic policy of the governments in the region and the
Malaysian prime minister in particular during the following two months or so, can best be
described as follows30
So illiterate is some of the bluster coming from top policy makers, and so discomforting
some of their actions, that investors' condence has been badly battered...
As the investors lost their condence in the policy makers, shares and currencies lost their
value.
After the crisis had calmed down by October, bad signals about the economic prospects of
South Korea (and to a lesser extent Japan) hit the market. Updating based on this adverse
information led to a further loss of condence. The increase in ambiguity induced a stronger
reaction than the change in the probability assessment about fundamentals seemed to justify.
The internal political situation in Korea prevented a swift and prudent reaction and added to
the sense of incompetence.31 It led to a further loss of condence and a corresponding outow
of capital.
Thus, in our opinion, the story of the South-East Asian crisis ts our model. In particular,
the perceived `over reactions', often interpreted as `speculative attacks', seem to be adequately
modelled by incorporating ambiguity.
6. Policy Prescriptions
The logic of the model suggests the following policy prescriptions.
30The Economist, September 6th, 1997, `Too late for a gentle landing'.
31With a presidential election comming up in a few weeks' time, the temptation in South Korea to take rm
action and restore condence was at a minimum. In the beginning of December, it negotiated the, up until
than, largest bail out ever with the IMF. Even this rescue failed to restore condence, mainly because of a
failing resolve by the Korean government to deal with the crisis and presidential candidates who seemingly had
no clue what to do. The incumbent president was severely damaged and the country was in eect leaderless.
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When a crisis is imminent |as possibly indicated by the combination of a sharp fall in share
prices in a country with a fragile nancial system and an increased outow of capital| it is
likely to be prevented by an independently approved devaluation: if the monetary authority
is pressured to devalue by, say, the IMF, it may retain its credibility. At the same time, the
regulatory policy should be careful not to harm the long term prospects of the local economy.
The anticipation of this regulatory policy by monetary authorities does not reduce its eec-
tiveness. On the contrary, a credible commitment to the policy leads to second best eciency,
provided there are no unexpected changes in the level of condence. The reason is similar to
that in the corresponding model of bankruns.32
At times, the regulatory policy may lead to an increase in the number of potential currency
crises. But this is not the consequence of a moral hazard problem. Rather, the policy removes
the need for excessive caution by the monetary authorities, which is due to the fragility of
their nancial systems. A commitment to the regulatory policy may increase the number of
currency crises to its second-best ecient level.33
Furthermore, measures should be taken to enhance the condence in the economies involved.
An increased transparency regarding the nancial position of companies and banks might do
a lot of good. It could be obtained, for instance, by disentangling industrial conglomerates,
liberalizing nancial markets and increasing foreign (condence enhancing!) takeovers. By
contrast, a restrictive monetary policy only damages the prospects of the investments even
further.
To prevent currency crises from becoming imminent, measures to strengthen the local nancial
sectors should have the highest priority. A stable nancial system enables share prices to
perform their task of absorbing the shocks caused by changes in the fortunes of investments
32See Spanjers (1999, [36], Section 5.6.3).
33In the context of bankruns, this argument builds on Allen and Gale (1998, [1]) and more recently, Allen
and Gale (2004, [2]). It more closely follows Spanjers (1999, [37], Chapter 5).
This argument was made in technical detail in a previous version of the paper, but is left out here to improve
the focus of the present version. It will form the basis of a separate paper.
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and the preferences of their owners.
Accordingly, as far as the logic of the model is concerned, the IMF handled the crisis quite well.
By providing bail out packages, it prevented large scale bankruptcies of companies and banks
under distress. Furthermore, its support may have stopped the fundamental crisis from turning
into a panic after the inevitable devaluation of the currencies involved. The demands for
liberalization of nancial markets and the lifting of restrictions on foreign ownership increased
transparency and may, after a period of transition, have helped to increase condence. The `all
purpose' recipe of a restrictive monetary and scal policy was, however, counter-productive.
But perhaps these requirements, which are the most painful for the governments involved,
serve as a warning to others that the political price of a bail-out is high. It may convince them
to implement condence enhancing measures and stabilize their nancial systems before the
next round of bad news hits.
7. Central and Eastern European Countries
Even though the conclusions of the model are in line with the stylized facts of the South-
East Asian crisis, its signicance surpasses that of providing an explanation for one (albeit
important) currency crisis of the past. Its conclusions also apply to other regions where similar
economies have xed exchange rates and may be prone to a loss of condence. A region that
immediately comes to mind is Central and Eastern Europe.
Most countries in this region presently have some kind of more or less exible exchange rate
regime, but it seems probable that this will change in the not-to-distant future.34 Some of
those countries aspire adopting the Euro and contemplate strategies to complete the process
by 2009-2010.35 The rules for joining require, amongst others, that the local currency has a
34Of the relevant Central and Eastern European countries, only Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania and Hungary
have de jure stabilized their exchange rate against the Euro. De facto, however, the same holds for the Czech
Republic, Latvia, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia, leaving Poland and Romania as the only countries with de
facto exible exchange rates. See Schnabl (2004, [34]).
35See, e.g. CNB (2003, [7]) regarding the Czech Republic. The Convergence Report 2004 of the European
Commission (2004, [16]) indicates, however, that the countries still have a long way to go.
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xed exchange rate target against the Euro for a period of at least two years, during which
the exchange rate must remain within a 2:25% band around this target.36 37
Assuming that a number of these economies make an eort to adopt the Euro at approximately
the same time, as seems likely, there will be an number of similar economies competing for
foreign investments through use of their exchange rate policies. These economies are likely to
remain subject to ambiguous beliefs from investors. Thus, a situation arises which satises
the basic assumptions of our model.
The logic of the model not only indicates that tailoring the reserve policy to preventing a
currency crisis may fail if the presence of ambiguity is not taken into account; even adjusting
currency reserves to allow for an endogenous loss of condence may fail to secure the exchange
rate target. The countries in question remain prone to an exogenous loss of condence, e.g.
spilling over from political turmoil in neighbouring countries.
The model also suggests a remedy to a loss of condence, be it endogenous or exogenous. This
remedy is to increase the stability of the banking sector, as well as other parts of the economy
and society that are hard hit by a large fall in share prices. This would allow the eects of
any loss of condence to be absorbed by share prices, rather than, ultimately, by the exchange
rate.
8. Concluding Remarks
The (qualitative) results derived for an exogenous loss of condence may also be obtained
for risk averse agents in the absence of ambiguity. As Spanjers (1999, [36], Conjecture 8:1)
suggests, qualitative results that depend on a risk premium can be replicated (after suitable
adaptations of the model) by using an ambiguity premium, and vice versa. This by no means
disqualies the results. On the contrary, it raises the question whether, at times, premia for
ambiguity are mistakenly interpreted as risk premia.
36See the Convergence Report 2000 (2000, [15], Annex D.4, p. 70).
37This view is not undisputed: see e.g. Egert et.al. (2005, [9]) and Orlowski (2005, [30]).
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Such misinterpretations are far from harmless, since they may suggest that policy measures are
useless, which are, in fact, eective. Policy makers can do little to reduce risk or to change risk
attitudes, so they may not be able to eectively change risk premia successfully. But they may
well be able to reduce the premia for ambiguity by increasing transparency and predictability.
Confusing the premia for ambiguity with risk premia may grossly underestimate the gains of
such `prudent' policy making.38 39 The `terror premium' on oil prices illustrates this point.
The dynamic inconsistency that leads to an endogenous loss of condence cannot be replicated
by assuming risk aversion. Decision makers with ambiguous beliefs who ex-ante plan a course
of action contingent on interim information may deviate from these contingent plans once the
information is actually obtained. This drives the main results of Section 4, where the monetary
authorities fail to recognize the presence of ambiguity.
In the context of our model, ambiguity can easily be detected once it is known what to look
for. It should not be accepted at face value that, ex-ante, investors superstitiously perceive a
correlation between their liquidity preference and asset returns. Rather, one should compare
the weights assigned to the asset states by the same type of investor, for actions that obtain
their worst utility level in dierent states. When these weights change with the action of the
investor, there is a strong indication that he faces ambiguity about asset returns.40
The stylized facts of the currency crisis which best ts the assumptions of the model, the
South-East Asian crisis, are in line with the conclusions. For the countries in Central and
Eastern Europe that intend to adopt the Euro, the model indicates that a stable nancial
sector may be the best guarantee for achieving this goal.
38See also Spanjers (2004, [37]).
39It should be noted that sometimes an increase in ambiguity may be benecial. In particular, it reduces the
incentives for free riding in the provision of public goods, as analysed in Eichberger and Kelsey (1995/2002,
[10]). Ambiguity may also be used constructively, e.g. in devising an institutional framework that implements
the provision of ecient eort levels in partnerships, as in Kelsey and Spanjers (1997/2004, [22]).
40That is, one should compare the weights of the asset states for actions that fail to be co-monotonic. See,
e.g. Schmeidler (1982/89, [33]).
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Appendix I
In this Appendix we determine the subjective probability distribution which the monetary
authorities may wrongly assume to represent the beliefs of investors. The weights that investors
ex-ante assign to the dierent states, given their optimal actions, are calculated. This is done
by focusing attention initially on the currency reserves b(b; 1) and g(b; 1). The resulting
weights are mutually consistent, so they are not `obviously' wrong.
Consider a monetary authority that chooses reserve holdings g(b; 1) in an economy with
a fragile banking system. It anticipates H-type investors to withdraw in Period 1: L-types
withdraw in Period 2; unless a bad signal is obtained and a fundamental currency crisis occurs.
Given their optimal withdrawal behaviour, the eective payouts for H-types and the weights
of the associated states are:41
(H; b; h) (H; b; `) (H; g; h) (H; g; `)
Period 1 + 1  (1  ) H
Period 2 0
vNM-utility H  [+ 1  (1  )] H  H
Weight H  (1    g) H    g
The number in a cell that combines states indicates the weight assigned to the event that
consists of these states. Thus, the weight to the event f(H; b; h); (H; b; `)g equals H (1  g).
Regarding L-types the following table results:
(L; b; h) (L; b; `) (L; g; h) (L; g; `)
Period 1 + 1  (1  ) 0
Period 2 0 h  1 L 0
vNM-utility L  [+ 1  (1  )] h  1 L 0
Weights L    bh L    b` L    gh L  (1  )
When the weights in the tables are interpreted as subjective probabilities, the investor acts as
if the conditional probabilities of the asset states vary with his type: In particular, under t = H
the event f(t; b; h); (t; b; `)g obtains a relative weight of 1     g; whereas the corresponding
weight conditional on t = L equals   (1   g). These beliefs suggest that investors perceive
a (non-existing) correlation between their own type and the occurrence of certain states.
41It should be noted, that the weights of the states may change when a dierent action is considered.
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Next consider the currency reserves b(b; 1): After receiving a good signal, the incentive con-
straint for L-types does not bind for $ = H : Since the central bank implements the highest
asset price compatible with equilibrium, after a good signal H-types obtain some of the asset
returns in Period 2, in addition to the currency reserves in Period 1.
Given their optimal withdrawal behaviour, the eective payouts for H-types and the weights
for the corresponding states are:
(H; b; h) (H; b; `) (H; g; `) (H; g; h)
Period 1 H
Period 2 0 > 0
vNM-utility H  H > H 

H
Weight H  (1    gh) H    gh
For L-types, we obtain:
(L; b; h) (L; g; h) f(L; b; `); (L; g; `)g
Period 1 0
Period 2 h  1 L > 0; < h 
1 
L
0
vNM-utility h  1 L > 0; < h 
1 
L
0
Weight L    bh L    gh L  (1    h)
Combining these four tables, and remembering that g = gh; the following additive weights
result:
(t; b; h) (t; b; `) (t; g; h) (t; g; `)
t = H H  (1    g) H    gh 0
t = L L    bh L    b` L    gh L  (1  )
These weights are maintained if the nancial system is suciently stable to ensure that after a
bad signal no currency crisis occurs. They are also obtained for the reserve holdings b(b; 1)
and g(b; 1); and consistent with the weights for  = 1: The reason is that the `worst case' for
H-types occurs in an event containing the state (H; b; `), whereas the `worst case' for L-types
occurs in an event containing the state (L; g; `):
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Appendix II
This sketch of the proof of Theorem 2 is organized as to which of the incentive compatibility
constraints hold for $ = H ; i.e., when H-types withdraw in Period 1 and L-types wait for
Period 2: For each of these cases, the optimal reserves  2 [0; 1] are determined. First we
distinguish between the case in which whenever (ICbL ) holds, so does (IC
g
L), and the case in
which this implication fails to hold.
(i) b()  g(): This refers to the case in which (ICgL) holds whenever (ICbL ) does.
(ia) (ICgL ) is violated. In this case, any assets will be liquidated at a loss, irrespective of
the signal received. The representative central bank would be better o by choosing reserve
 = 1:
(ib) (ICgL ) holds, but (IC
g
L) is violated. By assumption of case (i) constraint (IC
g
L) being
violated implies that (ICbL ) is violated too.
If the cost of liquidation, the probability of a bad signal and the fraction of L-types are
suciently low, the representative central bank would prefer to have its currency reserves
to equal g(): Otherwise, if the cost of liquidation, the probability of a bad signal and the
fraction of L-types are suciently high, the central bank would prefer to hold only currency
reserves.
(ic) (ICgL) holds but (IC
b
L ) is violated. In this situation, after a good signal H-types hold
some assets, after a bad signal a currency crisis occurs. The representative central bank would
rather increase its currency reserves to g(): After a good signal, the payout of Euros to
H-types would increase, after a bad signal the loss of liquidation would be reduced.
(id) (ICbL ) holds but (IC
b
L) is violated. After a bad signal, a currency crisis is prevented, but
some L-types ineciently end up holding Euros in Period 1: If the bad signal is suciently
likely and the fraction of L-types is suciently high, a decrease in reserves causes an increase in
eciency after a bad signal, which outweighs the losses due to a lower payout to H-types after
a good signal. If a good signal is suciently likely and the fraction of L-types is suciently low,
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the gains of a higher payout of Euros to H-types after a good signal outweighs the decreased
eciency after a bad signal.
(ie) (ICbL) holds. After both signals, H-types end up holding some assets. Reserves should be
increased to b():
(ii) b() > g(): In this case (IC
b
L ) holds whenever (IC
g
L) holds.
(iia) (ICgL ) is violated. See case (ia).
(iib) (ICgL ) is holds but (IC
b
L ) is violated. If the probability of a bad signal, the cost of
liquidation and the fraction of L-types are suciently high, ex-ante utility can be increased by
reducing currency reserves to b(): If the probability of a bad signal, the cost of liquidation
and the fraction of L-types are suciently low, the central bank would benet from increasing
currency reserves to g():
(iic) (ICbL ) holds but (IC
g
L) is violated. Here a reduction in currency reserves reduces the
ad-interim ineciency that occurs both after a good and a bad signal.
(iid) (ICgL) holds but (IC
b
L) is violated. If the bad signal is suciently unlikely and the fraction
of H-types is suciently high, the currency reserves should be increased to g(): Otherwise
the representative central bank could improve by reducing the reserves to b():
(iie) (ICbL) holds. See case (ie).
